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OBSCURED BOUNDARIES: DIMAYA’S 
EXPANSION OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS 
DOCTRINE 
Katherine Brosamle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States, despite being dubbed the “nation of 
immigrants,”1 is no stranger to excluding those deemed “undesirable” 
by the governing majority.2 This often-discriminatory intent to 
exclude manifests in immigration law, which has continually 
expanded and transformed throughout history. One pertinent 
development is the emergence of “crimmigration law”—a term 
generally referring to “the intersection of criminal law and procedure 
with immigration law and procedure.”3 
Three broad trends have contributed to this recent crimmigration 
phenomenon: 
[1] criminal convictions now lead to immigration law 
consequences ever more often; [2] violations of immigration 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, University of 
California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Ifrah Hassan for her valuable feedback and encouragement 
throughout the writing process. Special thanks as well to Molly Christ and Labdhi Sheth, to the 
members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligent work, and to my family for their 
enduring support. 
 1. This moniker was popularized after the posthumous publication of President John F. 
Kennedy’s book, A Nation of Immigrants, but has been traced as far back as 1874 when an editorial 
appearing in the The Daily State Journal of Alexandria noted, “We are a nation of immigrants and 
immigrants’ children.” See Miriam Jordan, Is America a ‘Nation of Immigrants’? Immigration 
Agency Says No, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/uscis-
nation-of-immigrants.html (discussing the removal of this phrase from the mission statement of 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services). 
 2. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 4–8 (2015) 
(providing an overview of American immigration policy); see generally Paul Brickner & Meghan 
Hanson, The American Dreamers: Racial Prejudices and Discrimination as Seen Through the 
History of American Immigration Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 203 (2004) (“The history of 
American immigration law can be divided into stages that reflect racial prejudices and 
discriminations of the day.”). 
 3. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 3; see also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (coining the phrase 
“crimmigration” and discussing its origins). 
(8) 52.2_BROSAMLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:46 AM 
188 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:187 
law are increasingly punished through the criminal justice 
system; and [3] law enforcement tactics traditionally viewed 
as parts of one or the other area of law have crossed into the 
other making enforcement of immigration law resemble 
criminal law enforcement and turning criminal law 
enforcement into a semblance of immigration law 
enforcement.4 
The first trend reflects a shift in the composition of people prioritized 
as “undesirable.” Throughout early American history, deportability 
“turned on race or national origin.”5 Focus transferred in the early 
twentieth century to the exclusion of specific ideologies such as 
anarchism, socialism, and communism.6 Finally, in the 1980s, “the 
preferred measure of undesirability [became] crime.”7 Today, 
immigration law, political rhetoric, and policy decisions reflect a 
mounting concern about so-called “criminal immigrants.”8 
Sessions v. Dimaya9 illustrates this increasingly complex web of 
crimmigration law. In this case, a lawfully-present immigrant acted 
unlawfully, and, in addition to the criminal punishment of 
incarceration, he faced the steepest immigration repercussion—
deportation without any possibility of relief.10 And yet, he ultimately 
 
 4. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 3. 
 5. Id. at 23. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
1703, 1723–36 (2018) (outlining the origins of crimmigration and detailing recent legislative action 
that has further merged criminal and immigration law together in Part I:B–C); David Alan 
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 196 
(2012) (“In defending Arizona’s recent efforts to crack down on illegal immigration . . . the state’s 
governor did not talk about immigrants using public benefits, the leitmotif of anti-
immigration rhetoric a decade or so ago; she talked about crime. Part of what has blurred the line 
between immigration enforcement and crime control may in fact be a kind of cultural obsession 
with violence and victimization, a tendency to see everything through the lens of crime control.”); 
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Immigration and 
Customs Enf’t Employees  (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (announcing increased 
enforcement priority to “criminal immigrants” under the Obama Administration); Katie Rogers, 
Trump Highlights Immigrant Crime to Defend His Border Policy. Statistics Don’t Back Him Up., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/politics/trump-
immigration-borders-family-separation.html; see generally César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014) (detailing the 
historic relationship between criminal and immigration law and contending that immigrant 
detention is punitive). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 10. Id. at 1210–11. 
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found relief, albeit through an unusual mechanism—the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.11 
 Aliens can be subjected to removal from the United States if they 
commit “aggravated felonies,”12 a term with many definitions, 
including the commission of a “crime of violence.”13 The term “crime 
of violence” in turn has two separate definitions.14 In Dimaya, the 
petitioner was charged as removable due to his prior convictions, 
which were deemed aggravated felonies under the definition of “crime 
of violence” set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).15 On review, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the petitioner’s immigration 
proceedings after determining that section 16(b) was 
unconstitutionally vague and thus, void.16 A divided Supreme Court 
ultimately upheld the Ninth Circuit’s holding, a decision that 
eliminated one ground for deportation of “criminal immigrants” and 
created broader uncertainty as to the scope of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.17 
Although a majority of the Justices agreed that section 16(b) was 
unconstitutionally vague, there was no settled majority as to the 
underlying basis for extending the void-for-vagueness doctrine into 
the realm of immigration law.18 This doctrine “guarantees that 
ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute 
proscribes.”19 It serves as a shield against “arbitrary or discriminatory 
law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to govern 
the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.”20 
However, the doctrine has traditionally been limited to criminal 
statutes with limited exceptions.21 By extending its application to 
immigration law, its scope has been called into question. 
 
 11. Id. at 1211–12. 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 13. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has as 
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”). 
 15. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1211. 
 16. Id. at 1212. 
 17. Id. at 1223. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1212 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)). 
 20. Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)). 
 21. Id. 
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This Comment argues that the Supreme Court properly extended 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine to find section 16(b) 
unconstitutionally vague. Part II sets forth the relevant statutory 
framework, and Part III outlines the factual and procedural history of 
the Dimaya case. Part IV breaks down the reasoning of the opinion 
delivered by Justice Kagan, distinguishes the concurrence penned by 
Justice Gorsuch, and highlights the dissenting arguments of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Part V analyzes the Justices’ 
various interpretations of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and 
advocates for the broad construction outlined in the concurrence. Part 
VI examines the practical impacts of Dimaya on immigration 
enforcement and future immigration reform. Finally, Part VII 
concludes that Dimaya’s legacy lies in its furtherance of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. 
II.  RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
On June 27, 1952, American immigration law and policy were 
completely revamped with the passage of the comprehensive 
McCarran-Walter Act, more commonly known as the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA).22 The Senate Judiciary Committee drafted 
the INA after a two-year study on immigration conducted in response 
to mounting fears of communism.23 Congress passed the INA, despite 
President Harry S. Truman’s veto and concerns about the “severe 
hardships involving exclusion, deportation, and denaturalization.”24 
Although amended over the past several decades,25 the INA endures 
as the main source of immigration law.26 
Truman’s disregarded apprehensions about the severe difficulties 
involved with deportation and the structure of the INA remain 
germane. Indeed, the issue raised in Dimaya centers on a specific 
ground for the deportation of “criminal immigrants.” 
 
 22. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:2, Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2018). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also MARGARET C. JASPER, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE LAW OF IMMIGRATION § 1:7, 
Westlaw (database updated 2012) (noting President Truman’s veto of the INA). 
 25. The INA, including all subsequent amendments and additional provisions, is contained in 
Title 8 of the United States Code which deals with “Aliens and Nationality.” 
 26. 1 SHANE DIZON & POOJA DADHANIA, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE 2D § 1:120, Westlaw 
(database updated Feb. 2019). 
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Again, with the rising crimmigration trend, criminal convictions 
are increasingly coupled with immigration consequences. Under the 
INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time 
after admission is deportable”27 and ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.28 Thus, “removal is a virtual certainty for [] alien[s] found to 
have an aggravated felony conviction,” regardless of the length of 
their residency in or connections to the United States.29 
The term “aggravated felony” is defined in section 1101, 
subdivision 43 of the INA through a wide-ranging list of specific 
offenses and cross-references to various federal criminal statutes.30 
Among this list of qualifying offenses is “a crime of violence (as 
defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ) for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”31 The aforementioned criminal 
statute (hereinafter referred to as “section 16”) sets forth two distinct 
definitions for the term “crime of violence.”32 First, subdivision a, 
known as the elements clause, covers any “offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person or property of another.”33 Second, subdivision b, 
known as the residual clause, covers any “offense that is a felony and 
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”34 
When analyzing a crime under the residual clause, courts use a 
“categorical approach,” which looks to the general “nature of the 
offense,” as opposed to whether “‘the particular facts’ underlying a 
conviction” or “the statutory elements of a crime” present the 
substantial risk demanded.35 Thus, courts seeking to apply the residual 
clause of section 16 look to an “idealized ordinary case” of any given 
offense.36 
 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 28. Id. § 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C); see also 3 SHANE DIZON & POOJA DADHANIA, IMMIGRATION 
LAW SERVICE § 13:222, 2D Westlaw (updated Aug. 2019) (detailing the impact of aggravated 
felony convictions on eligibility for relief). 
 29. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018). 
 30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012). 
 31. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 16. 
 33. Id. § 16(a). 
 34. Id. § 16(b). 
 35. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018). 
 36. Id. at 1214 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)). 
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In sum, section 16 delineates two classifications of “crimes of 
violence”—elemental and residual—both of which qualify as 
aggravated felonies, the commission of which is grounds for 
deportation. The underlying proceedings in Dimaya illustrate how 
immigration courts have interpreted and utilized section 16’s residual 
clause in removal proceedings. 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Original Immigration Proceedings 
Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya, a native citizen of the 
Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1992.37 In 2007, and again in 2009, Dimaya was convicted 
of first-degree residential robbery under California law.38 Each 
conviction carried a two-year sentence.39 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) characterized these 
convictions as aggravated felonies and subsequently charged Dimaya 
as removable without eligibility for relief.40 The Immigration Judge 
(IJ) assigned to Dimaya’s case agreed with DHS and found that the 
robbery convictions qualified as aggravated felonies under the 
definition set forth in the residual clause of section 16.41 The 
categorical approach employed by section 16(b) required that the IJ 
look to an idealized version of a burglary, not the actual circumstances 
of Dimaya’s two robberies. Specifically, the IJ cited United States v. 
Becker42 for the proposition that a burglary is a crime of violence and 
explained that “unlawful entry into a residence is by its very nature an 
offense where is apt to be violence [sic], whether in the efforts of the 
felon to escape or in the efforts of the occupant to resist the felon.”43 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) subsequently dismissed 
Dimaya’s appeal on the same ground and affirmed the IJ’s decision.44 
 
 37. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) aff’d sub nom Sessions v. Dimaya, 
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 38. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. Specifically, Dimaya was charged under California Penal 
Code, section 459. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112. 
 42. 919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 43. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112. 
 44. Id. 
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B.  Ninth Circuit Review 
Dimaya filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision with the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.45 During the interim period 
between initial arguments and the court’s judgment, the Supreme 
Court decided Johnson v. United States,46 which found the term 
“violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)47 to be 
unconstitutionally vague.48 In response to Johnson, the Ninth Circuit 
ordered supplemental briefs and arguments due to the similar structure 
and wording of section 16 and the overturned ACCA provision.49 
Ultimately, seeing no meaningful distinctions between the two 
provisions, the Ninth Circuit directly applied Johnson, and held that 
section 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded Dimaya’s 
case to the BIA for further proceedings.50 
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s extension of Johnson, three 
other circuit courts took up the same issue with varying results,51 and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this split in circuit 
authority.52 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
In determining how the Johnson holding applied to the issue 
presented in Dimaya, two distinct inquiries were presented—first, 
whether the void-for-vagueness analysis used to reach the Johnson 
decision could apply in this civil context, and second, whether the 
statutes at issue in Dimaya and Johnson were sufficiently analogous 
to warrant a similar finding of unconstitutionality. The Justices vastly 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the 
use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment 
for such term if committed by an adult, that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”). 
 48. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 49. Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1112. 
 50. Id. at 1120. 
 51. Compare Shuti v. Lynch, 15-3835 (6th Cir. July 7, 2016) (finding section 16(b) 
unconstitutionally vague), and United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (same), 
with United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (upholding 
section 16(b)). 
 52. Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016). 
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diverged in their views on both questions. Ultimately, the judgment 
came down to a 5–4 vote in favor of overturning section 16(b), and 
resulted in an opinion by Justice Kagan, a concurrence in part and in 
the judgment by Justice Gorsuch, and two separate dissents from both 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.53 
A.  The Court’s Opinion 
The Court’s opinion sets forth the majority’s judgment and a 
plurality analysis of the scope of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
To ultimately find section 16(b) unconstitutionally vague under 
the Johnson framework, the opinion begins with a justification for the 
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to a civil immigration 
statute.54 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kagan cited an immigration 
case pre-dating the INA itself—Jordan v. De George55—where the 
Supreme Court found an immigration law making aliens deportable 
for convictions of “crimes of moral turpitude” to be “sufficiently 
definite.”56 Although not a criminal statute, the Supreme Court in 
Jordan tested and upheld this immigration provision under the void-
for-vagueness doctrine because of the “grave nature of deportation,” 
which is a “‘drastic measure,’ often amounting to lifelong ‘banishment 
or exile.’”57 Drawing on this notion, the Dimaya plurality in essence 
cited the crimmigration phenomenon, without explicitly using the 
term, as the basis for application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to 
immigration law today. In light of and considering the “particularly 
severe penalty” of deportation and increasing connection between 
deportability and criminal convictions, the plurality determined that 
the most exacting vagueness standard should apply even though 
removal is a civil matter.58 
Having established the relevance of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, the majority looked to Johnson, which it described as a 
“straightforward decision, with equally straightforward application 
here.”59 The residual clause of the ACCA provision at issue in Johnson 
defined the term “violent felony” as one involving a “serious potential 
 
 53. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). 
 54. Id. at 1212–13. Justice Gorsuch did not join this analysis in Part II. 
 55. 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951). 
 56. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231.). 
 57. Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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risk of physical injury,”60 whereas section 16’s residual clause defines 
a “crime of violence” as one involving a “substantial risk that physical 
force” will be used.61 In Johnson, the Supreme Court identified two 
features of ACCA’s residual clause that jointly “produced hopeless 
indeterminacy,” and rendered the clause unconstitutionally vague.62 
First, the use of a categorical approach, centered around a crime’s 
“ordinary case,” was imprecise and speculative.63 Second, the 
ACCA’s residual clause failed to identify the required “threshold level 
of risk.”64 Although the second element did not independently render 
the provision unduly vague, when compounded with the first issue, it 
did.65 
Turning then to the residual clause of section 16, the Dimaya 
majority found the same two dangerous elements—the use of a 
categorical approach and an indeterminate level of required risk.66 
Thus, section 16(b), just like the ACCA’s residual clause, created 
“more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause 
tolerates.”67 
To conclude, the opinion addressed the dissenters—first Justice 
Thomas68 and then Chief Justice Roberts. Thomas questioned the 
validity of the void-for-vagueness doctrine at length before ultimately 
taking the position that if vagueness were to be considered, analysis 
under the residual clause of section 16 should switch from categorical 
to case-specific to avoid invalidating the law.69 The plurality noted this 
was the same argument raised in Johnson’s dissent.70 There, like here, 
 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018). 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012). 
 62. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting Johnson v. United State, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 
(2015)). 
 63. Id. at 1214 (“[A] court was supposed to ‘imagine’ an ‘idealized ordinary case of the 
crime’—or otherwise put, the court had to identify the ‘kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a 
crime involves.’ But how, Johnson asked, should a court figure that out? By using a statistical 
analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct? ACCA provided 
no guidance, rendering judicial accounts of the ‘ordinary case’ wholly ‘speculative.’”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015)) (“‘By combining 
indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much 
risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause’ violates the guarantee 
of due process.”). 
 66. Id. at 1215–16. 
 67. Id. at 1216 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558). 
 68. Gorsuch did not join in this section, Part IV-A, which rebutted Thomas’s dissent. 
 69. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1216. 
 70. Id. 
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the Government did not request such a switch, which would create 
new and separate constitutional inquiries.71 
Conversely, Roberts’s dissent adopted the Government’s position 
that section 16 was sufficiently distinguishable from its ACCA 
counterpart.72 First, the Government noted that unlike the ACCA 
provision, section 16(b)’s temporal restriction73 arguably made the 
inquiry “more focused.”74 The majority noted that although the ACCA 
had no such temporal restriction on its face, in practice, the Supreme 
Court had never looked at conduct beyond that committed in the 
course of the offense when applying the ACCA’s residual clause.75 
Thus, the express inclusion of this restriction in section 16 did not 
change the inquiry or make it more focused.76 Second, the 
Government focused on section 16’s use of the term “physical force” 
versus the ACCA’s use of the term “physical injury.”77 The majority 
found this distinction meaningless.78 Third, the Government noted that 
a “confusing list of exemplar crimes” proceeded the ACCA provision 
that contributed to the statute’s vagueness.79 Since section 16 lacked 
any such list, the Government argued section 16 was more readily 
understandable.80 The majority again found this argument to be 
illogical.81 Finally, the Government cited judicial experience, in that 
courts have divided less frequently on the residual clause of section 16 
than they did on the ACCA residual clause, as a sign that section 16 
was clearer than the ACCA.82 The majority vehemently rejected this 
notion.83 
 
 71. Id. at 1217 (noting that the categorial approach originated out of Sixth Amendment 
concerns that sentencing courts would become fact-finders). 
 72. Id. at 1218. 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (stating that the risk must arise from acts taken “in the course of 
committing the offense”). 
 74. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1219–20. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1220. 
 78. Id. at 1220–21 (noting that “evaluating the risk of ‘physical force’ itself entails considering 
the risk of ‘physical injury’”). 
 79. Id. at 1221. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (“To say that ACCA’s listed crimes failed to resolve the residual clause’s vagueness is 
hardly to say they caused the problem. . . . Johnson found the residual clause’s vagueness to reside 
in just ‘two’ of its features: the ordinary-case requirement and a fuzzy risk standard. Strip away the 
enumerated crimes—as Congress did in § 16(b)—and those dual flaws yet remain.”). 
 82. Id. at 1221–22. 
 83. Id. at 1223 (“[T]his Court’s experience in deciding ACCA cases only supports the 
conclusion that § 16(b) is too vague . . . . The Government would condemn us to repeat the past—
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Having set forth her argument and refuted the dissenters, Kagan 
concluded that under Johnson, the residual clause of section 16 was 
unconstitutionally vague and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.84 
B.  Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence 
While Justice Gorsuch joined in the judgment and many parts of 
the Court’s opinion, he diverged on the issue of the scope and 
applicability of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to non-criminal 
matters. Whereas the plurality focused on the gravity of a statute’s 
consequences as justification for extending the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine to immigration law, Gorsuch went further and opined that the 
doctrine should apply more broadly to all criminal and civil laws.85 
Gorsuch first sought to ensure that the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine enjoyed “a secure footing in the original understanding of the 
Constitution.”86 To do so, Gorsuch detailed an extensive history of the 
“due process underpinnings” of the doctrine.87 Collectively, 
Gorsuch’s compendium of varied sources spoke to a history, in both 
English common law and American jurisprudence, of concerns over 
the lack of fair notice in laws that pose the risk of the deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property as penalty—a fear not limited just to criminal 
laws.88 
Gorsuch turned to the inquiry of an applicable standard of 
review—“What degree of imprecision should this Court tolerate in a 
statute before declaring it unconstitutionally vague?”89 The 
Government argued that civil laws should only be deemed 
unconstitutional if they are “unintelligible,” whereas criminal laws 
 
to rerun the old ACCA tape, as though we remembered nothing from its first showing. But why 
should we disregard a lesson so hard learned? ‘Insanity,’ Justice Scalia wrote in the last ACCA 
residual clause case before Johnson, ‘is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting 
different results.’ We abandoned that lunatic practice in Johnson and see no reason to start it 
again.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1224, 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 1228. 
 87. Id. at 1224–28 (citing an expansive range of sources, including everything from recent 
Supreme Court precedent to 14th century caselaw, the scholarship of Lord Coke and Blackstone 
among contemporary law review articles, to the Declaration of Independence and Federalist 
Papers). 
 88. Id. (“[T]he Constitution sought to preserve a common law tradition that usually aimed to 
ensure fair notice before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could take place, whether under 
the banner of the criminal or the civil law.”). 
 89. Id. at 1228. 
(8) 52.2_BROSAMLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2019  1:46 AM 
198 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:187 
have historically been required to provide “ordinary people . . . fair 
notice of the conduct” made punishable.90 In light of the history he set 
forth, Gorsuch could not see why different standards were needed.91 
Moreover, the Supreme Court had previously extended the strictest 
vagueness test to civil laws—namely, “those abridging basic First 
Amendment freedoms.”92 Turning to the argument promulgated by the 
plurality portion of the Court’s opinion, that the applicability of the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine hinges on the severity of a law’s 
consequences, Gorsuch highlighted the severity of many civil 
penalties: 
Today’s “civil” penalties include confiscatory rather than 
compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes 
to be taken, remedies that strip persons of their professional 
licenses and livelihoods, and the power to commit persons 
against their will indefinitely. Some of these penalties are 
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those 
associated with misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher 
than the punishment for felonies. And not only are “punitive 
civil sanctions . . . rapidly expanding,” they are “sometimes 
more severely punitive than the parallel criminal 
sanctions for the same conduct.”93 
Therefore, under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a “fair notice 
standard” should apply to all laws. 
C.  Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on distinguishing the 
residual clauses of section 16 from the ACCA, such that section 16(b) 
should have been upheld.94 Roberts did not entertain the debate over 
the scope of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, because he did not find 
 
 90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 
(2015)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1228–29 (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 
489, 499 (1982)). 
 93. Id. at 1229 (alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The 
Middle Ground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE. L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992)). 
 94. Id. at 1234 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see The Court’s Opinion, supra Section IV(A) 
(discussing the arguments of the Government and Roberts regarding the differences between the 
residual clauses). 
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section 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague, even under the 
heightened criminal standard.95 
D.  Thomas’s Dissent 
Justice Thomas joined in Roberts’s dissenting analysis of the 
residual clauses, but wrote separately to discuss the void-for-
vagueness doctrine.96 Thomas’s dissent is most at odds with Gorsuch’s 
concurrence—whereas Gorsuch advocated for a broader interpretation 
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, Thomas questioned the doctrine 
all together.97 
Thomas surmised that the majority’s holding depends on the 
validity of three premises: “[1] [t]he Due Process Clause requires 
federal statutes to provide certain minimal procedures, [2] the 
vagueness doctrine is one of those procedures, and [3] the vagueness 
doctrine applies to statutes governing the removal of aliens.”98 
Thomas then questioned each proposition in turn. 
First, Thomas noted that the void-for-vagueness doctrine could 
only operate if the “law of the land” view of due process99 was 
invalid.100 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection101 of this view over 
a century and a half ago, Thomas argued that it had “textual and 
historical support.”102 Thomas contended that vagueness analysis did 
not begin until the twentieth century, but rather courts historically had 
followed a “traditional rule of lenity”103—a “tool of statutory 
construction.”104 The void-for-vagueness doctrine, Thomas argued, 
was not historical; rather, it was part of the Supreme Court’s “bad habit 
 
 95. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1234 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. This view “require[s] only that our Government . . . proceed . . . according to written 
constitutional and statutory provision[s] before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property.” Id. 
at 1242–43 (alterations in original) (quoting Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1264 n.1 (2017) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276–77 
(1855). 
 102. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1243. 
 103. The “traditional rule of lenity” refers to the “common law doctrine, also known as ‘strict 
construction,’ that directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.” 
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 (2004). 
 104. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1244. 
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of invoking the Due Process Clause to constitutionalize rules that were 
traditionally left to the democratic process.”105 
Second, Thomas contended that, even assuming that the Due 
Process Clause banned vague laws, the void-for-vagueness argument 
would not apply to civil, immigration laws.106 Noting the “founding 
generation’s” decision that due process was inapplicable to removal 
statutes,107 Thomas noted that due process was not implicated until the 
twentieth century with regards to removal statutes.108 And even still, 
the Supreme Court “upheld vague standards in immigration laws that 
it likely would not have tolerated in criminal statutes.”109 Therefore, it 
is “at best, unclear” whether federal immigration law can violate the 
Due Process Clause due to vagueness.110 
Thomas found it unnecessary to resolve this uncertainty, as the 
issue raised in this case was solvable on narrower grounds—namely, 
how, not if, vagueness challenges could be raised.111 “If the vagueness 
doctrine has any basis in the original meaning of the Due Process 
Clause, it must be limited to case-by-case challenges to particular 
applications of a statute.”112 Thus, Thomas believed that Dimaya 
needed to show how section 16 was vague as to him specifically.113 
Without this showing, Thomas found no issue with any purported 
vagueness of section 16. 
Thomas concluded by arguing that the residual clause of section 
16 should be switched from a categorical analysis to a case-specific 
one.114 
V.  THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS 
The most derisive inquiry raised in Dimaya was not the specific 
issue with section 16(b), but rather the fundamental question regarding 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1245. 
 107. Id. at 1245–46 (discussing a 1798 debate over the Alien Acts, in which the Federalists 
successfully argued that due process was inapplicable to statutes governing the removal of aliens).  
 108. Id. at 1247. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1247–48. 
 111. Id. at 1250. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (“In my view, § 16(b) is not vague as applied to respondent. When respondent 
committed his burglaries in 2007 and 2009, he was ‘sufficiently forewarned . . . that the statutory 
consequence . . . is deportation.’ At the time, courts had ‘unanimous[ly]’ concluded that residential 
burglary is a crime of violence, and not ‘a single opinion . . . ha[d] held that [it] is not.’”). 
 114. Id. at 1252–59; see id. at 1216–18 (majority opinion) (discussing this argument). 
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the scope and applicability of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
Arguments were raised in favor of a vast spectrum of interpretations. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is typically contemplated within 
the criminal context.115 Justice Kagan, writing for the plurality, called 
for its broader application to all statutes which result in severe 
consequences or penalties.116 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch 
championed opposing extremes—Thomas dissented by calling the 
doctrine into question altogether,117 while Gorsuch, in his 
concurrence, advocated for its equal application to all laws, 
irrespective of the severity of consequences.118 In the absence of a 
majority holding on this issue, the scope of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine is presently unclear. It is this Comment’s position that 
Gorsuch’s broad interpretation is the most appropriate, in light of the 
history of and principles supporting the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
A.  Historical Origins 
While Gorsuch recalls a history with origins reaching back far 
beyond even the framing of the Constitution, Thomas dismisses the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine as a recent judicial creation. In reality, the 
history is unclear, but falls somewhere in between. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as it is known today, was likely 
not used prior to the nineteenth century.119 At common law, the rule 
of lenity governed.120 Without a doctrine of judicial supremacy, 
English courts could not “explicitly . . . invalidate the product of the 
legislative branch,” so they “resorted to canons of construction to give 
‘content’ to vague statutes.”121 This practice carried into colonial 
America and thus neither the Federalists Papers nor the Constitutional 
Convention expressly contemplated vagueness as grounds for 
invalidating laws.122 Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine does 
not have explicit common law origins, the principles underlying the 
 
 115. Id. at 1212–13. 
 116. Id. at 1213. 
 117. Id. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 1224, 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 119. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 274 
(1948); see also Christina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void 
for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 263 (2010) (noting that the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine was not used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
 120. See Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 274–75; see also Lockwood, supra note 119, at 263 (noting the same). 
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doctrine—the need for fair notice and fear of arbitrary enforcement—
were contemplated and implicated throughout this period and in early 
American law.123 
As Gorsuch notes, many Constitutional provisions “presuppose 
and depend on the existence of reasonably clear laws.”124 This reflects 
a concern expressed in the Declaration of Independence and 
deliberated throughout the drafting of the Constitution—that arbitrary 
power could divest citizens of life, liberty, or property without 
sufficient notice. “Fair notice of the law’s demands . . . is ‘the first 
essential of due process.’”125 Due process, as it was contemplated at 
the inception of the Constitution, is embodied in the Fifth Amendment 
which clearly protects the inalienable rights announced in the 
Declaration of Independence: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”126 One such 
protection against an unjust deprivation of rights is the requirement 
that laws be definite and comprehensible, such that (1) the people 
know what conduct could result in a deprivation of their liberty; and 
(2) laws are not arbitrarily enforced.127 
Further, the structure of the Constitution allowed for the transition 
from the practice of statutory lenity to use of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. While Congress is assigned, “All legislative Powers,”128 the 
 
 123. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
 124. Id. at 1226–27 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961)) (“Take the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that arrest warrants must be supported by 
probable cause, and consider what would be left of that requirement if the alleged crime had no 
meaningful boundaries. Or take the Sixth Amendment’s mandate that a defendant must be informed 
of the accusations against him and allowed to bring witnesses in his defense, and consider what use 
those rights would be if the charged crime was so vague the defendant couldn ’t tell what he’s 
alleged to have done and what sort of witnesses he might need to rebut that charge. Without an 
assurance that the laws supply fair notice, so much else of the Constitution risks becoming only a 
‘parchment barrie[r]’ against arbitrary power.”). 
 125. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1226–28 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (“The internal effects of a mutable policy 
are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the 
people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they 
cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before 
they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is 
to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that 
be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”). 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
legislature . . . prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be 
regulated.”). 
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judiciary has the authority to decide “Cases” and “Controversies.”129 
“That power does not license judges to craft new laws to govern future 
conduct, but only to ‘discer[n] the course prescribed by law’ as it 
currently exists and to ‘follow it’ in resolving disputes between the 
people over past events.”130 This structure provides courts with the 
power of judicial review,131 but the judiciary’s role is still distinct from 
that of the legislature. 
B.  Early Precedent 
Gradually, the common law practice of statutory lenity and the 
American principle of judicial review combined and, in light of fair-
notice concerns, developed into the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
Two early cases—The Enterprise132 and United States v. 
Sharp133—entertained the issue of vagueness when evaluating laws 
that were incomprehensible to the respective courts as written.134 In 
The Enterprise, the court found there was no ground for enforcement 
of an unintelligible embargo law135 and in Sharp, the court quashed an 
indictment brought under an ambiguous law.136 The constitutional 
grounds for these decisions are unclear, and scholars have long 
debated whether the decisions rested in the rule of lenity, or an early 
formulation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.137 This dispute is 
 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 130. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1227 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 
U.S. 738, 866 (1824)).  
 131. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”). 
 132. 8 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 4499) (evaluating a statute setting forth the 
requirements for when ships may enter ports during an embargo). 
 133. 27 F. Cas. 1041 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 16264) (considering a statute prohibiting seamen 
from “making a revolt”). 
 134. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119, at 275–76. 
 135. Enterprise, 8 F. Cas. at 735 (“If no sense can be discovered for them, as they are here 
introduced, the court had better pass them by as unintelligible and useless, than to put on them, at 
great uncertainty, a very harsh signification, and one which the legislature may never have 
designed.”). 
 136. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. at 1043 (“I am not able to support [the law] by any authority to be met 
with, either in the common, admiralty, or civil law. If we resort to definitions given by philologists, 
they are so multifarious, and so different, that I cannot avoid feeling a natural repugnance, to 
selecting from this mass of definitions, one, which may fix a crime upon these men, and that too of 
a captal [sic] nature; when, by making a different selection, it would be no crime at all, or certainly 
not the crime intended by the legislature. Laws which create crimes, ought to be so explicit in 
themselves, or by reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may 
know what acts it is their duty to avoid.”). 
 137. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119, at 275 n.18. 
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unsurprising, as the two practices are often difficult to distinguish—
while the techniques are different, the results are often the same. 
Indeed, “prolonged application of a canon of construction could 
circumvent the will of the legislature just as surely as would an 
articulate declaration that the statute was ‘void for vagueness.’ The 
result therefore, would be the same . . . [b]ut the technique [of strict 
construction is] . . . more subtle.”138 
The less-distinct blending of the doctrines continued through the 
early twentieth century as courts focused on fair notice.139 In the 
1920s, the Supreme Court began to explicitly connect the requirement 
of fair notice to due process, giving the concept of vagueness 
constitutional legs.140 Thus, while the origin of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine is uncertain, it is apparent that “the requirement of notice was 
foremost in the minds of the Court in implementing this doctrine.”141 
C.  Contemporary Precedent 
The stringent requirements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
have long been limited to criminal laws, while civil laws have been 
held to a more permissive standard.142 Generally stated, the 
contemporary void-for-vagueness doctrine demands that criminal 
 
 138. Id. at 274 (“For example, the court would ‘strictly construe’ a statute requiring that notice 
of a certain offense be proclaimed ‘in two market towns near the place where the offense was 
committed’ to mean ‘those towns nearest the place of commission of the crime.’ Since notice was 
not so given, defendant was released because not legally convicted.”); see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 
S. Ct. 1204, 1226–27 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 139. Lockwood, supra note 119, at 264 (“[I]n 1891, in United States v. Brewer, the Court 
provided, ‘[l]aws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties 
may know what acts it is their duty to avoid,’ without reference to constitutional support. In 1914, 
Mr. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States limited the scope of the above principle with the often-
quoted statement, ‘[t]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating 
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree,’ without specifically 
providing a constitutional basis for the decision to uphold the portion of the Sherman Act that was 
challenged as vague.”). 
 140. Id. at 264–66 (“In the 1921 case of United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., the Court relied 
generally on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, holding that a[] regulation . . . was ‘void for 
repugnancy to the Constitution.’ Interestingly, by 1926, the Court expressed its firm belief that a 
statute’s vagueness offends the Constitution. . . . In 1927, in Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., this 
constitutional requirement was applied to a state . . . statute. The Court referenced L. 
Cohen Grocery Co., . . . [and] then provided, ‘[w]e are now considering a case of state legislation 
and threatened prosecutions in a state court where only the Fourteenth Amendment applies; but that 
amendment requires that there should be due process of law, and this certainly imposes upon a State 
an obligation to frame its criminal statutes so that those to whom they are addressed may know 
what standard of conduct is intended to be required.’”). 
 141. Id. at 268. 
 142. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982). 
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statutes sufficiently and specifically define the offense such that 
“ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”143 This distinction is due to the Court’s “greater 
tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties 
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less 
severe.”144 Although the doctrine is typically associated with criminal 
laws, in practice, it is more broadly applied. The Supreme Court has 
indeed extended the vagueness doctrine to civil laws, namely in 
instances where the severity of the penalties at issue is great.145 
D.  Proper Scope 
The plurality in Dimaya opted to extend the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine to section 16(b) because the penalty—deportation—is the 
most severe immigration consequence.146 Justice Gorsuch questioned 
this decision, pondering: 
[G]rave as [deportation] may be, I cannot see why we would 
single it out for special treatment when . . . so many civil 
laws today impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Why, 
for example, would due process require Congress to speak 
more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien 
than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil 
commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his 
family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no 
good answer.147 
Indeed, no answer truly satisfies this question. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine is rooted in the fundamental concerns over the 
 
 143. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 144. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99; see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 
1212–13 (2018). 
 145. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (applying a “relatively strict” vagueness 
test to an ordinance that “nominally impose[d] only civil penalties,” because it was “quasi-criminal” 
considering its “prohibitory and stigmatizing effect”); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 
516–17 (1964) (finding a vagueness review warranted for a statute that “severely curtail[ed] 
personal liberty” by restricting “freedom of travel”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) 
(applying the vagueness doctrine to an immigration removal statute in light of the “grave nature of 
deportation”); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (applying the 
doctrine to a civil commitment statute); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 241 
(1932) (extending the doctrine to a civil statute with a penalty that was “not consistent with any 
purpose other than to inflict punishment”). 
 146. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1210–12. 
 147. Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fair notice. If a law is 
constructed so vaguely that an ordinary person cannot determine the 
conduct criminalized or penalized, then it is too vague, regardless of 
the degree of the deprivation associated with its violation. 
Moreover, extending the void-for-vagueness doctrine to all laws 
honors the proper separation of powers. It is the duty of the legislature, 
not the judiciary, to make laws. Although judicial review gives courts 
the power to interpret laws, it does not give courts the power to write-
in meaning all-together where poor drafting has rendered a law 
incomprehensible. 
Rather than depending on an arbitrary distinction between civil 
laws with severe penalties and those with less-than-severe penalties, 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine should apply across the board to all 
laws—civil or criminal—as a procedural due process guarantee. 
Dimaya illustrates the importance of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine in practice. Had the traditional rule of lenity been used as it 
once was, each of the circuits involved in the split of decision prior to 
the Supreme Court’s ruling would have assigned a meaning to section 
16(b). Some may have continued with the categorical approach, others 
may have switched to a case-specific approach; some may have 
incorporated a requisite level of risk, others may have set a list of 
qualifying offenses. This is not a simple case of judicial review or 
basic statutory interpretation. Such decisions regarding section 16(b) 
would have fundamentally changed the effects of the law depending 
on the jurisdiction it was enforced in. It is nearly impossible to have 
fair notice of a law that holds different meanings depending on your 
location. Instead, to void a law as unconstitutionally vague puts the 
law out of use, lest it be remedied through the legislative process. This 
approach best balances the due process concerns and separation of 
powers principles at play. Limiting the scope of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to certain groups of laws is unsound and 
unnecessarily narrow. 
VI.  IMMIGRATION IMPLICATIONS 
Although much of the decision focused on debate over the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, the core issue in Dimaya was the use of 
section 16(b) as a ground for deportability. The Supreme Court’s 
decision will have a slight immediate effect on immigration 
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enforcement; however its true impact lies in its potential for future 
litigation. 
A.  Section 16(b) as a Ground for Deportability 
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dimaya, President 
Donald Trump reacted on Twitter, posting: 
Today’s Court decision means that Congress must close 
loopholes that block the removal of dangerous criminal 
aliens, including aggravated felons. This is a public safety 
crisis that can only be fixed by....  
….Congress – House and Senate must quickly pass a 
legislative fix to ensure violent criminal aliens can be 
removed from our society. Keep America Safe!148 
The White House subsequently released an official statement, also 
characterizing the decision as creating a “loophole” and calling for 
legislative action.149 Immigration agencies responded similarly.150 
It is concerning that the administration has painted this decision 
as creating a loophole, a term that disparages the fundamental 
constitutional principles at play.151 However, to call for legislative 
action is the correct response. Indeed, this is the purpose of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine—to make Congress aware of constitutionally 
defective laws so that they may be remedied through the legislative 
process, rather than having courts assign new meaning. 
 
 148. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 2:34 PM),  
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/986357230219022342. 
 149. Statement by the Press Secretary Calling on Congress to Fix Loopholes in Our 
Immigration Laws, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-press-secretary-calling-congress-fix-loopholes-immigration-laws. 
 150. DHS Press Secretary Statement on Sessions v. Dimaya, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/04/17/dhs-press-secretary-statement-
sessions-v-dimaya (imploring Congress to “take action on passing legislation to close public safety 
loopholes, such as these, that encourage illegal immigration and tie the hands of law enforcement”);  
ICE Deputy Director Statement on Sessions v. Dimaya, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ICE 
NEWSROOM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/statements/ice-deputy-director-statement-
sessions-v-dimaya (referring to the decision as “yet another example of the need for Congress to 
urgently close the loopholes that allow criminal aliens to avoid removal and remain in the United 
States”). 
 151. Miriam Valverde, What the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Means for the Deportation of 
Criminal Immigrants, POLITIFACT (Apr. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2018/apr/23/what-us-supreme-court-decision-means-deportation-c/ (“A poorly 
written statute is not a loophole . . . . It’s a constitutional defect. Congress has the authority to write 
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government.”). 
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In many ways, the reactions from President Trump and his 
administration were overstated. Dimaya only directly voided one of 
the eighty grounds for removal outlined in the INA.152 Even looking 
specifically to removal of “criminal immigrants,” section 16(b) is a 
sub-definition for just one of the more than twenty grounds for 
establishing an aggravated felony conviction.153 To those facing 
deportation on section 16(b) grounds, this decision matters. Yet in 
light of the many other grounds for deportation of “criminal 
immigrants” that have developed through the crimmigration 
phenomenon, it is unclear how substantial this immediate impact will 
actually be.154 
As of now, the residual clause of section 16 cannot be used by 
immigration authorities to qualify a conviction as being a crime of 
violence to satisfy the aggravated felony ground for removability. It is 
clear the executive branch and immigration authorities alike want 
Congress to fix and clarify section 16(b) so that it may be used in 
future immigration proceedings. Yet, until that action is taken, the 
residual clause of section 16 is void for immigration purposes. 
B.  Future Vagueness Challenges 
Dimaya’s most substantial impact on immigration law and policy 
is likely to be in the future litigation it inspires. This decision creates 
a sense of possibility. At minimum, immigration laws that result in 
deportation or removal are now clearly subjected to the same strict 
void-for-vagueness standard that criminal laws are held to.155 Section 
16(b) is by no means the only questionable provision of the INA—
“Courts have used terms such as ‘nebulous,’ ‘bewildering,’ and 
‘labyrinthine’ to describe immigration laws.”156 For example, the 
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Insanity? HARV. L.R. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/vague-criminality-
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decision in terms of future and retroactive application). 
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(May 3, 2018, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/why_sessions_v._dimaya_matters. 
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REV. 1127, 1128 (2016) (citing Baltazar-Balcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004); 
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Ninth Circuit has struggled with the aggravated felony sub-definition 
of an “offense related to obstruction of justice.”157 Moreover, the use 
of imprecise terms such as “crime involving moral turpitude,” “single 
scheme of misconduct,” and “particularly serious crime” in the INA 
could conceivably be challenged under the vagueness doctrine.158 
With the Dimaya decision, the doors are open to procedural due 
process challenges to INA provisions on the basis of vagueness. 
Keeping in mind the twin aims of the void-for-vagueness doctrine—
providing fair notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement—
immigration reformists are now armed with a new tool to combat the 
mounting crimmigration phenomenon. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“[T]he power vested in the America courts of justice of 
pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional, forms one of the most 
powerful barriers which has ever been devised against tyranny of 
political assemblies.”159 The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in 
fundamental American concerns about the unjust deprivation of 
fundamental rights. This doctrine allows the courts to hold the 
legislature accountable for imprecise laws and ensures that ordinary 
people have fair notice of what the law requires. The Supreme Court’s 
extension of this doctrine into the realm of immigration law is 
promising and shows a recognition of the severe consequences of 
immigration enforcement. However, as this Comment advocates, the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine ought to be extended to all laws—civil or 
criminal, without regard for the severity of the consequences—so as 
to comport with the standards of due process. Although the actual, 
immediate impact on immigration law is limited, Dimaya’s legacy will 
likely be in its furtherance of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Dimaya 
opens the door for future constitutional challenges at least to imprecise 
immigration laws, and conceivably indefinite civil laws. 
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